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Abstract. We formulate and analyze game-theoretic problems for systems governed by integral 
equations. For Volterra integral equations, we obtain and prove necessary and sufficient 
conditions for linear-quadratic problems, and for problems that are linear-quadratic in the 
control. Also, we obtain necessary conditions for one type of pursuit-evasion Volterra games. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
The theory of differential games is a well-developed area, within the broader context of systems 
theory and control theory.  
 
The present paper deals with game theory for systems described by integral equations. The 
results and techniques developed herein also apply to differential games, since Volterra integral 
equations contain also systems governed by ordinary differential equations. They also contain a 
variant of the particular type of pursuit and evasion policies formulated by Pontryagin in [P2]. 
Pontryagin defined a policy for one player as a “functional” of the recent history of the trajectory 
and the actions of the other player; it is reasonable to specialize this “functional” into a Volterra 
integral operator.  When the evolution of the state is governed by a Volterra integral equation, an 
interpretation of each player’s policy as a causal operator of the entire history of the game is 
already embedded into the model, and, in that sense, it extends Pontryagin’s formulation.  
 
We mention here that the study of differential games on the basis of necessary conditions of 
Pontryagin’s extremum principle (usually called “maximum principle” in control theory) was   
initiated in Pontryagin’s paper [P1]. Although today differential games are studied mostly by 
dynamic programming methods, the study of games for integral equations again requires 
necessary conditions and extremum principles, since integral equations are not well-suited for 
dynamic programming. 
 
We note that a variety of problems in Economics, Population Dynamics, and related areas, have 
been modelled via integral equations. For such models, the related game-theoretic problems are 
naturally games with integral equations as state dynamics. 
 
In this paper, we deal mostly with linear-quadratic (LQ) integral games and games that are 
linear-quadratic n the controls (LQC) but generally nonlinear in the state. We note that LQ 
differential games have been well-studied in the research literature, and merely as a sample we 
mention [B, E]. The theory of necessary conditions for optimal control problems for integral 
equations is well established, for example [S], and we shall make freely use of optimal control 
results in our study of game theory for integral equations. 
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2. Quadratic forms over L2 spaces. 
 
We consider the following quadratic functional over 2 ( , )m nL G R R , where G is a bounded 
open set in d – dimensional Euclidean space: 
 
11 12 11
1 2 1 22
21 22 2
11 12 1 11
1 2 1 22
21 22 2 2
( ) ( ) ( )
( , ) : [ ( ) ( )]
( ) ( ) ( )
( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( )
[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( )
T T
G
T T T T
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K x K x w x
E w w w x w x dx
K x K x w x
L x y L x y w y w x
w x w x dx dy q x q x dx
L x y L x y w y w x
   
    
   
     
      
     

  
 
            (2.1) 
 
We set 
 
1 11 12 11 12
2 21 22 21 22
1
2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )
( ) : , ( ) : , ( , ) : ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )
( )
( ) :
( )
w x K x K x L x y L x y
w x K x L x y
w x K x K x L x y L x y
q x
q x
q x
     
       
     
 
  
 
  (2.2) 
 
 
We postulate: 
 
[A]. The matrix-valued functions (with real entries) ( ), ( , )K x L x y  are bounded measurable on 
G ,  G G , respectively. 
 
[B]. The matrix-valued functions ( ), ( , )K x L x y  are symmetric, in the sense that 
11 11 22 22 12 21
11 11 22 22 12 21
( ) ( ), ( ) ( ), ( ) ( ),
( , ) ( , ), ( , ) ( , ), ( , ) ( , ) .
T T T
T T T
K x K x K x K x K x K x
L x y L y x L x y L y x L x y L y x
  
  
 
 
(This entails no loss of generality: arbitrary (i.e. not necessarily symmetric) matrices 
( ), ( , )ij ijK x L x y can be replaced by their symmetrizations 
1 1
2 2
( ) : [ ( ) ( )], ( , ) : [ ( , ) ( , )]
T T
ij ij ji ij ij jiK x K x K x L x y L x y L y x   ɶ ɶ  without affecting the values of the 
corresponding quadratic integral forms.) 
 
[C]. Each of the matrices 11 22( ), ( ), ( )K x K x K x is nonsingular, with an inverse that is also 
bounded measurable on G. 
 
[D]. The matrix-valued functions 11 11( ( ), ( , ))K x L x y  are jointly positive definite in the sense that, 
for every non-zero 2
1 ( , )
mw L G R , 
1 11 1 1 11 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) 0
T T
G G G
w x K x w x dx w x L x y w y dx dy    .  
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The matrix-valued functions 22 22( ( ), ( , ))K x L x y  are jointly negative definite in the sense that, for 
every non-zero 2
2 ( , )
nw L G R ,  
2 22 2 2 22 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) 0
T T
G G G
w x K x w x dx w x L x y w y dx dy    . 
 
We shall prove: 
 
Proposition 2.1. For every 2
2 ( , )
nw L G R , there exists a unique minimizer of E with respect to 
1w . (We shall denote that minimizer by 1* 2( | )w w .) 
 
Proof: For arbitrary but, in the context of the present proof, fixed 2
2 ( , )
nw L G R , we set 
 
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 11 12 2
1 12 2 1 12 2 1 1
( ) : ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
T T
G G G
T T T
G G G G
E w w x K x w x dx w x L x y w y dx dy
w x K x w x dx w x L x y w y dx dy q x w x dx
  
  
  
   
  (2.3) 
 
 
The first variation of 1E  is 
1 1 11 1 1 11 1
2 21 1 2 21 1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
T T
G G G
T T T
G G G G
E w x K x w x dx w y L y x w x dydx
w x K x w x dx w y L y x w x dy dx q x w x dx
  
  
  
  
  
   
 (2.4) 
 
For a solution 1wɶ  that annihilates 1E , the second variation of 1E is 
 
2
1 1 11 1 1 11 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )
T T
G G G
E w x K x w x dx w y L y x w x dy dx           (2.5) 
 
thus  
 
2
1 0E   if 1w is not a.e. 0 in G        (2.6) 
 
by the condition of joint positive definiteness of the pair of kernels   11 11( , )K L . 
 
It remains to show the existence and uniqueness of a 1wɶ  that annihilates 1E , i.e. solves 
 
11 1 11 1 1 12 2 12 2( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) 0
G G
K x w x L x y w y dy q x K x w x L x y w y dy       (2.7) 
 
Since 11( )K x  is nonsingular, eq. (2.7) is a linear Fredholm integral equation of the second kind 
in the unknown function 1w and the Fredholm alternative applies: either () has a solution, or the 
corresponding homogeneous equation has a nontrivial solution, i.e. for some nonzero 1w  we have 
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11 1 11 1( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) 0
G
K x w x L x y w y dy         (2.8) 
 
Pre-multiplication of (2.8) by 
1 ( )
Tw x  and integration (with  x as the variable of integration) of the 
resulting equation over G yields a contradiction to the joint positive-definiteness of 11 11( , )K L . 
Thus (2.7) is solvable. The same type of positive-definiteness argument shows that the solution is 
unique. /// 
 
Notation: we shall denote the solution obtained in the above proposition by 1* 2( | )w w . 
 
 
Corollary 2.2. By the same token, for every 2
1 ( , )
Mw L G R , there is a unique maximizer 
*
2 1( | )w w  of E  with respect to 2w . /// 
 
Theorem 2.1. The mapping from 2 ( , )m nL G R R   into itself, defined by 
 
1 1* 2
*
2 2 1
( | )
( | )
w w w
w w w
   
   
   
֏           (2.9) 
 
has a unique fixed point.  
 
Notation: We shall denote that unique fixed point by 1**
**
2
w
w
 
 
 
 . 
 
Proof: We consider the system 
 
1 20 ; 0E E              (2.10) 
         
where   
 
1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2[ ( , ; ) ( ) ( , ; ) ( )]
G
E E w w x w x E w w x w x dx            (2.11) 
 
The system (2.10) becomes 
 
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) 0
G
K x w x L x y w y dy q x          (2.12) 
 
and in extenso  
 
11 1 12 2 11 1 12 2 1
21 1 22 2 21 1 22 2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )] ( ) 0 ;
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )] ( ) 0
G
G
K x w x K x w x L x y w y L x y w y dy q x
K x w x K x w x L x y w y L x y w y dy q x
    
    


  (2.13) 
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By our assumption on non-singularity of ( )K x , eq. (2.12) is a linear Fredholm integral equation 
of the second kind, and we establish existence of solution via the Fredholm alternative. It 
suffices to show that the associated homogeneous equation  
 
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) 0
G
K x w x L x y w y dy          (2.14) 
 
cannot have a non-zero solution. If it does, we pre-multiply  (2.14) by ˆ ( )Tw x  and integrate over 
G  with respect to x , where  
 
1
2
( )
ˆ ( ) :
( )
w x
w x
w x
 
   
          (2.15) 
     
 
thus obtaining 
 
 
1 11 1 2 22 2
1 11 1 2 22 2
[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
[ ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )] 0
T T
G
T T
G G
w x K x w x w x K x w x dx
w x L x y w y w x L x y w y dy dx
 
  

 
    (2.16) 
 
which contradicts the conjunction of the joint positive-definiteness of 11 11( , )K L  and the joint 
negative-definiteness of 22 22( , )K L . Thus () has a solution which we denote by 
1**
**
2
w
w
 
 
 
. It is plain, 
from the extensive form () of (), that **
1** 1* 2( | )w w w  and 
** *
2 2 1**( | )w w w , which proves the 
existence and the uniqueness of the wanted fixed point. ///  
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3.  Jointly definite pairs of kernels. 
 
We examine the quadratic form on 2( , )nL G R  defined by a pair of kernels ( )K x and ( , )L x y : 
 
( ) : ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )T T
G G G
w w x K x w x dx w x L x y w y dx dy         (3.1) 
 
We assume the same conditions of measurability, boundedness, and symmetry, as in section 2. 
 
The form   can be represented as follows: 
 
1
2
( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )T
G G
w w x y M x y w x y dx dy    ɶ ɶ       (3.2) 
   
where 
 
1
1
( ) | | ( ) ( , )
( , ) : , ( , ) : ; | |:
( ) ( , ) | | ( ) G
w x G K x L x y
w x y M x y G dx
w y L x y G K y


  
    
   
ɶ    (3.3) 
 
  
The proof of (3.2) is a direct calculation of substituting (3.3) into (3.2).  
 
Consequently the positive-definiteness of ( , )M x y , uniformly for ( , )x y G G  , is a sufficient 
condition for the joint positive-definiteness of ( , )K L .  
 
If we assume, in addition to all our other assumptions, that ( )K x  is positive definite, uniformly 
for x G , then the  nonnegative-definiteness of the form 
 
( ) : ( ) ( , ) ( )T
G G
w w x L x y w y dx dy           (3.4) 
 
is a sufficient condition for the joint positive-definiteness of ( , )K L . 
When the kernel L is continuous on 
________
G G , by the same type of argument as that used in the 
well-known theory associated with the name of Mercer [M], the nonnegative-definiteness of L is 
equivalent to the condition that, for all finite collections of points { : 1 }ix i N  in G G , and n 
– dimensional real vectors { , 1 }ia i N  , we should have  
 
1 1
( , ) 0
N N
T
i i j j
i j
a L x x a
 
          (3.5) 
 
 
 
When L  has the representation 
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2( , )
( , ) ( ) ( )Tk k
k
L x y x y  

  ℓ ℓ
ℓ N
        (3.6) 
 
where N is a countably infinite set of indices and { : }k k N  is a complete orthonormal system 
in 2( , )nL G R , then the nonnegative definiteness of L is tantamount to the nonnegative-
definiteness of the infinite-dimensional matrix    2
( , )
: k k   ℓ ℓ N in 
2 ( , )ℓ N R . This is verified by 
expanding a generic element w of 2( , )nL G R  as 
 
( ) ( )k k
k
w x c x


N
          (3.7) 
 
after which it follows that 
 
2( , )
( ) ( , ) ( )T k k
G G
k
w x L x y w y dx dy c c

   ℓ ℓ
ℓ N
       (3.8) 
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4.  Application to linear-quadratic Volterra integral games. 
 
We consider a linear Volterra integral game with state equation 
 
0
0
( ) ( ) [ ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )]
t
t
y t y t A t s y s B t s u s C t s v s ds         (4.1) 
 
The state y takes values in p – dimensional  Euclidean space, and the two controls, u 
(minimizing) and v (maximizing), in m – and n – dimensional Euclidean spaces, respectively. 
 
The time horizon of our problem will be an interval 0 1[ , ]t t . 
 
It is clear that our model covers also the case of linear differential games.  
 
By using a resolvent kernel ( , )S t s  corresponding to direct kernel ( , )A t s , the solution of eq.  
(4.1) takes the form 
 
0
1 1 1
( ) ( ) [ ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )]
t
t
y t y t B t s u s C t s v s ds          (4.2) 
 
where 
 
0
1 0 0
1
1
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ;
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ;
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
t
t
t
s
t
s
y t y t S t y d
B t s B t s S t B s d
C t s C t s S t C s d
  
  
  
 
 
 



       (4.3) 
 
It is convenient to take (4.2) as the equation of state dynamics and as the starting point of all 
further calculations. 
 
By using the representation (4.2), it is clear that a quadratic functional in y, u, and v can be 
transformed to a quadratic functional in u and v of the type discussed in section 2 of the present 
paper. Then all the mathematical questions boil down to finding conditions that guarantee the 
appropriate positive –  and negative – definiteness conditions that imply existence and 
uniqueness of a saddle-point control.  
 
For simplicity we will consider only a particular case of quadratic performance functional, that 
still provides enough structure to create a meaningful game-theoretic problem. We take a 
performance functional 
 
1
0
1 1
0 0
1 1
1 0 1 1 1 12 2
1
2 2 22
: ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
[ ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )]
t
T T T T
t
t t
T T T
t t
J y t P y t y t P t y t u t Q t u t v t R t v t dt
y t P t s y s u t Q t s u s v t R t s v s ds dt
    
  

 
  (4.4) 
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We will assume, without expending or repeating the definitions, that all kernels that appear in eq. 
(4.4) have the appropriate symmetry properties as detailed in section 2. 
 
By using the representation (4.2), we can represent J   as 
 
1
0
1 1
0 0
1
0
11
2
1
11 121
2
21 22
1 2
( ) 0 ( )
[ ( ) ( )]
0 ( ) ( )
( , ) ( , ) ( )
[ ( ) ( )]
( , ) ( , ) ( )
[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
t
T T
t
t t
T T
t t
t
T T
t
Q t u t
J u t v t dt
R t v t
L t s L t s u s
u t v t ds dt
L t s L t s v s
q t u t q t v t dt
   
    
  
   
    
  
  

 

      (4.5) 
 
The functional   involves terms independent of the controls u and v, and therefore does not 
affect the solution of the game-theoretic problem; for this reason, we shall not give the explicit 
calculation of  . 
 
The kernels in (4.5) are expressed in terms of the kernels in (4.4) and (4.2) as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            (4.6) 
 
It can be readily verified that, if the kernels 1 2( ), ( , )P P   are nonnegative-definite (in the sense 
detailed in section 2), then 11L is nonnegative-definite; likewise, if 1 2( ), ( , )P P   are 
nonpositive-definite, then 22L  is nonpositive-definite. The situation, however, is complicated by 
the fact that the same kernels 1 2( ), ( , )P P    appear in the expressions for both, 11L  and 22L . 
Consequently, we do not rely on 1 2( ), ( , )P P   , but we examine the kernels 1 1 2 2, , ,Q R Q R . For 
1
1 1
1
1
11 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
max( , )
1 2 1 2
12 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
max( , )
1 2 1
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , );
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
t
T T
t s
t s
T
t s
t
T T
t s
t
T
s
L t s B t t P B t s B t P B s d
B t P B s d d Q t s
L t s B t t P C t s B t P C s d
B t P C s d d
   
     
   
    
  
 
  


 


1
1
1 1
1 1 1
0
22 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
max( , )
1 2 1 2
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
2
;
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , );
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ;
t
t
t
T T
t s
t s
T
t s
t t t
T T T T
t t t
T
L t s C t t P C t s C t P C s d
C t P C s d d R t s
q t y t P B t t y P B t d y P B t d d
q

   
     
         
  
 
  


 
  
1 1 1
0
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )
t t t
T T T
t t t
t y t P C t t y P C t d y P C t d d             
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the kernels 1 1,Q R , the coercivity constants 1 1 1 1( ), ( ), ( , )Q R Q R    are nonnegative numbers 
defined by the requirements that, for every 2 (0, ; )mw L T R , we have 
 
1
2
0
1 1
2
0 0
1 1 1
2
0 0 0
2
1 1 (0, ; )
2
1 1 (0, ; )
2
1 1 1 1 (0, ; )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )|| || ;
( ) ( , ) ( ) ( )|| || ;
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) || ||
m
m
m
t
T
L Tt
t t
T
L Tt t
t t t
T T
L Tt t t
w t Q t w t dt Q w
w t R t s w s ds dt R w
w t Q t w t dt w t R t s w s ds dt Q R w





 

 
  
R
R
R
  (4.7) 
 
Of course, these coercivity constants are meaningful under the appropriate conditions of 
nonnegative-definiteness or positive-definiteness of  1 1 1 1, , ,Q R Q R  , respectively. 
Likewise, under appropriate nonpositive-definiteness conditions or negative-definiteness 
conditions, the accretivity constants 2 2 2 2( ), ( ), ( , )Q R Q R   , defined by 
 
 
1
2
0
1 1
2
0 0
1 1 1
2
0 0 0
2
2 2 (0, ; )
2
2 2 (0, ; )
2
2 2 2 2 (0, ; )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )|| || ;
( ) ( , ) ( ) ( )|| || ;
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )|| ||
n
n
n
t
T
L Tt
t t
T
L Tt t
t t t
T T
L Tt t t
w t Q t w t dt Q w
w t R t s w s ds dt R w
w t Q t w t dt w t R t s w s ds dt Q R w



 
 
  

 
  
R
R
R
  (4.8) 
 
 
Consequently, sufficient conditions for 1 1 11 22( , , . )Q R L L  to fulfill the conditions of section 2 (with 
1 1,Q R  in the role of 11 22,K K ) are: 
 
(I). 1 1( ) 0, ( ) 0Q R   . 
(II). 1 2 1 2( , ) , ( , )Q Q R R   are sufficiently large. 
 
 
Of course, “sufficiently large” means large enough to make 11L  nonnegative-definite and 22L  
nonpositive-definite. The detailed calculations, of how large these constants should be, are 
straightforward, and we do not include them here. 
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5.  Volterra integral games that are linear-quadratic in the controls (LQC). 
 
We consider a game with state equation that is linear in the controls, with performance functional 
that is quadratic in the controls; the state dynamics and the performance functional are generally 
nonlinear in the state. 
The controlled integral equation is 
 
0
0 0 1 2( ) ( ) [ ( , , ( )) ( , , ( )) ( ) ( , , ( )) ( )]
t
t
y t y t f t s y s F t s y s u s F t s y s v s ds       (5.1) 
 
and the performance functional is 
 
1
0
0 1 2
1 1
11 12 222 2
: { ( , ( )) ( , ( )) ( ) ( , ( )) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )}
t
t
T T T
J g t y t g t y t u t g t y t v t
u t G t u t u t G t v t v t G t v t dt
   
  

     (5.2) 
 
We set 
 
21 12( , ( )) : ( , ( ))
TG t y t G t y t          (5.3) 
 
As in the previous sections, u is the minimizing control, and v the maximizing control.  
 will stand for the co-state; its values are co-vectors (row vectors) of the same dimension as the 
state y. The Hamiltonian of the problem is 
 
1
0 1 2
1 1
11 12 222 2
0 1 2
( , , , , ( )) : ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( )[ ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ]
T T T
t
t
H t y u v g t y g t y u g t y v
u G t y u u G t y v v G t y v
s f s t y F s t y u F s t y v ds


   
   
  
i
      (5.4) 
 
For each control function v, we denote by *( | )u v  a minimizer of J over u, and by  
**
v

 a 
maximizer of *(( | ), )J u v v  over v. We set 
**
*
**
: ( | )u u v
 
 . Similarly *( | )v u  s a maximizer of 
( , )J u v  over v, and **u  is a minimizer of 
*( , ( | ))J u v u  over u, and we set ** *
**: ( | )v v u . 
A pair of controls 
**
**
( , )u v
 
 gives the lower value of the game, and a pair **
**( , )u v  gives the 
upper value of the game. 
 
We will carry out the construction of 
**
**
( , )u v
 
. We start with constructing *( | )u v .  
The first construction will rely on the Hamiltonian equation for the costate and an extremum 
principle for the control u. For each control function v, this is an optimal control  problem for a 
Volterra integral system, for which necessary conditions for optimality are well-known. The two 
equations we need are 
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( ) ( , ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )) ;
( , ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )) 0
y
u
t H t y t u t v t
H t y t u t v t
 

 
 
i
i
         (5.5) 
 
From the extremum principle for u (i.e. the second equation of (5.5)), we find  
 
11
* 11 12 1 1( | )( ) ( , ( )) ( , ( )) ( ) ( , ( )) ( , , ( )) ( )
t
T T T
t
u v t G t y t G t y t v t g t y t F s t y t s ds
 
    
 
  (5.6) 
 
Substitution of (5.6) into the Hamiltonian equation (the first of (5.5)) yields the restricted 
Hamiltonian  
 
1
1
* *
1
0 1 11 12 1
1
1 21 1 11 12
1 1
22 12 2
( , , , ( )) ( , , ( | ), , ( ))
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , , ) ( )
( 1) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
t
T T
t
t
T
t
T T
H t y v H t y u v v
g t y g t y G t y G t y v F s t y s ds
g t y v G t y s F s t y ds G t y G t y v
v G t y v g t y v G
 




 
 
    
 
 
     
 

  



i i
1
1
1
1 1
21 1 1 1 1
1
11 1 12 1 2 2 2
0 2
1
1 11 12 1 1
( , ) ( ) ( , , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , , ) ( )
( )[ ( , , ) ( , , ) ]
( 1) ( ) ( , , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , , )
t
t
t
T T T
t
t
t
t t
T T
t t
t y s F s t y ds
G t y g t y G t y v f s t y s ds
s f s t y F s t y v ds
s F s t y G t y G t y v g t y F t y



 



 

 
    
 
  
 
    
 



  ( )T d ds  
 

 
 
            (5.7) 
 
This restricted Hamiltonian is a quadratic functional in v and consequently a critical point is 
 
1
** 1 1
22 21 11 12
21 1 2
1
21 11 1 2
( ) [ ( , ( )) ( , ( )) ( , ( )) ( , ( ))]
( , ( )) ( , ( )) ( , ( ))
[ ( , ( )) ( , ( )) ( , , ( )) ( , , ( ))] ( )
T T
t
T T T
t
v t G t y t G t y t G t y t G t y t
G t y t g t y t g t y t
G t y t G t y t F s t y t F s t y t s ds
 


  

  


  


   (5.8) 
 
This critical point will be unique and a maximizer of the restricted Hamiltonian *H under certain 
conditions to be specified later. 
 
For the purpose of simplifying the notation, we shall make the convention that, unless otherwise 
explicitly specified, the variables inside each matrix-valued function will be  t and y(t). 
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We set 
 
1
3 22 21 11 12
1
3 21 11 1 2
3 21 1 2
1 1
4 3 3 4 3 3
: ;
( , , ) : ( , , ) ( , , ) ;
: ;
: , ( , , ) : ( , , )
T T T
T T T
T T T T
G G G G G
F s t y G G F s t y F s t y
g G g g
g G g F s t y G F s t y


 
 
 
 
 
      (5.9) 
 
Then 
 
1**
4 4( ) ( , , ( )) ( )
t
T T T
t
v t g F s t y t s ds

         (5.10) 
 
Then we have 
 
1**
* 5 5
**
1
5 11 12 4 1
1
5 11 12 3 1
( ) ( | )( ) ( , , ( )) ( ) ;
: ( ) ;
( , , ) : ( ( , , ) ( , , ))
t
T T T
t
T T T
T T T
u t u v t g F s t y t s ds
g G G g g
F s t y G G F s t y F s t y

 


  
  
  

    (5.11)   
 
 
 
Sufficient conditions for the existence, uniqueness, and maximin property (relative to the 
Hamiltonian) of the solution 
**
**
( , )u v
 
 are that the kernels 11 22,G G  are, respectively, uniformly 
positive-definite and uniformly negative-definite; in that case, the kernel 1
3 22 12 11 12
TG G G G G   is 
also uniformly negative-definite. 
 
Now we will substitute the expressions (5.10) and (5.11) for in the state dynamics and in the 
Hamiltonian equation for the co-state to obtain a system of integral equations for ( , )y 

 , the 
state and the co-state for the lower game. In the few equations below, we shall use simply 
( , )y  for the state and the co-state of the lower game, instead of   ( , )y 

.    
The equations for state and co-state of the lower game are 
 
1
0 0
1
1 1
0 0 1
( )
0 1
1
22
( ) ( ) ( , , ( )) ( , , , ( )) ( ) ;
( ) ( , ( ), ( ), ( )) ;
( , ( ), ( ), ( )) : ( , ( )) ( , , ( )) ( )
( ) ( , , , ( ), ( ), ( )) ( )
t t t
T
t t s
y t
t
T
t
t t
T
t t
y t y t c t s y s ds C t s y s d ds
t H t y t y
H t y t y h t y t h s t y t s ds
s H s t y t y y s d ds
   
 
 
     


  
 
  

  

 
i i
i i
  (5.12) 
 
where  
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0 0 1 5 2 4
1 1 5 2 4
0 1 5 2 4 5 11 5 2 11 4 1 5 2 4
1
( , , ( )) ( , , ( )) ( , , ( )) ( , ( )) ( , , ( )) ( , ( ));
( , , , ( )) ( , , ( )) ( , , ( )) ( , , ( )) ( , , ( )) ;
( , ( )) ;
( ,
T T
T T
T T T T T T
c t s y s f t s y s F t s y s g s y s F t s y s g s y s
C t s y s F t s y s F s y s F t s y s F s y s
h t y t g g g g g G F g G F g F g F
h s t
  
  
 
     
1
0 1 5 2 4 5 1 4 2 5 11 5 5 12 4 4 21 5 4 22 42
1
2 5 11 5 5 12 4 4 21 5 4 22 42
1 5 5
, ( )) [ ] ;
( , , , ( ), ( ), ( )) [ ( , ,...) ( ,...) ( , ,...)
( , ,...) ( , ,...) ( , ,...)
T T T T T T T T T
T T T T
T
y t f g F g F g F g F g G g g G g g G g g G g
H s t y t y s y F s t G t F t F G F F G F F G F
F s t F s F s
  
 
        
    
  1 2 4 4 2( , ,...) ( , ,...) ( , ,...) ( , ,...) ( , ,...)]
T T TF t F s t F s F s F t    
 
     (5.14) 
 
Remark 5.1. Non-zero-sum Volterra games (with different performance functional for each of 
the players), and games with several players (instead of just two), can be treated by similar 
methods as in sections 4 and 5 of the present paper.  
The case of two players in a non-zero-sum game, with two performance functionals, 
 
0
0
0( ) ( ) ( , , ( ), ( ), ( )) ;
: ( , ( )) ( , ( ), ( ), ( )) ; 1,2
t
t
T
i i i
t
y t y t f t s y s u s v s ds
J F T y T G t y t u t v t dt i
 
  


      (5.15) 
 
where 1J is to be minimized and 2J is to be maximized, and if we are interested in the lower 
value of the game, we would have two co-states and two Hamiltonians,  
 
 ( , ) ( , , , , ) ( , , , ) ( ) ( , , , , ) ( 1,2)
T
i Y i i i
t
H F T Y f T t y u v G t y u v s f s t y u v ds i      (5.16) 
 
and Hamiltonian equations 
 
( ) ( , ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )) ( 1, 2)i y i it H t y t u t v t i   i       (5.17) 
 
When we are interested in the lower value of the game, we minimize the Hamiltonian 1H  with 
respect to u (which is possible for LQ or LQC games), thus obtaining *( | )u v ,  then we form the 
Hamiltonian 2* 2 2 * 2( , , , ( )) ( , , ( | ), , ( ))H t y v H t y u v v i i  which is then to be maximized with 
respect to v , thus yielding **v , and then **** *( | )u u v . 
The same process can be used for 3 or more players which alternate between minimizers and 
maximizers, say with controls u (minimizer), v (maximizer) and w (minimizer), where the 
sequence of control decisions is u, v, w. From the 3 Hamiltonians and 3 co-states, we determine 
first *( | , ),u v w then 
**( | )v w , then ***w , then 
*** **
***( | )v v w  and 
***
*** * ***( | , )u u v w .     ///                                                                                                                             
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6.  Pursuit-evasion Volterra games. 
 
It will facilitate our presentation to start with a more general Volterra game, and, after we 
develop some general equations, to work in more specific directions. We consider the game with 
state equation 
 
0
0( ) ( ) ( , , ( ), ( ), ( ))
t
t
y t y t f t s y s u s v s ds        (6.1) 
 
over a time-horizon 0 1[ , ]t t , where 1t  is not fixed but rather the game continues as long as a non-
capture criterion 
 
( , ( ), ( ), ( )) 0t y t u t v t       (6.2) 
 
is satisfied, and terminates as soon as the capture criterion  
 
1 1 1 1( , ( ), ( ), ( )) 0t y t u t v t       (6.3) 
 
is met. 
 
Eq. (6.1) will be postulated to hold for 0 1[ , )t t t . At the final (but not a priori fixed) time 1t , it is 
convenient to set  
 
1 1: ( ) , : ( )U u t V v t       (6.4) 
 
and treat U and V as additional variables. 
 
The state y can represent the difference between two states, say x and z, corresponding to the 
positions of the pursuer and the evader. The “capture”, according to our definition, takes place 
when (6.3) is satisfied, and it amounts to driving the state and the controls in a desired manifold; 
in case this manifold consists if the single point 0, for the desired value of the state, then it 
becomes capture in the ordinary sense, as used in the classical literature on differential games 
and positional games.  
 
For notational efficiency, we shall denote 1( )y t also by Y. We will have occasion to use also 
1( )y tɺ , and we set 1: ( )W y t ɺ . 
 
As it will become clear in the work below, this is, in essence, a matter of notational convenience: 
the values 1 1( ) , ( )u t v t  would have to be taken into account as separate decision variables, 
regardless of the notation we may choose.  
 
The performance functional J will be taken in the form  
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1
0
1 1 1 1: ( , ( ), ( ), ( )) ( , ( ), ( ), ( ))
t
t
J F t y t u t v t G t y t u t v t dt        (6.5) 
 
 
The inclusion, in the performance functional, of the values of the controls at the final time 1t  
does not create complications, since, even if the capture criterion was independent of the final 
values of the controls, the remaining ingredients of the problem would cause the final values of 
the controls  to appear in the Hamiltonian equations; on the contrary, omission of the final values 
of the controls from J would create conceptual complications, since then we would have values 
of the controls that appear in other locations in a set of necessary conditions but affect neither the 
state dynamics nor the performance functional. 
 
After the final values of the controls have explicitly included in J, it creates no additional 
conceptual complications if they are also explicitly included in the capture criterion  . 
 
Towards the discovery of the relevant first-order conditions, we will use a penalty term, which 
for convenience we split into 3 different parts: 
 
1
0
1
0 0
0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
2 0
: ( ) ( ) ( , , ( ), ( )) ;
: ( , ( ), ( ), ( ));
: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , , ( ), ( ), ( ))
t
t
t t
t t
P y t y t f t t y t u t dt
P t y t u t v t
P t y t y t f t s y s u s v s ds dt


 
    
 
 
 
   
 

 
   (6.6) 
 
Now the decision variables are u, v, U, V, and the state variables are y, Y. The time of capture, 1t , 
may be considered as a variable affecting the state dynamics. 
The Lagrangian of our problem is 
 
0 1 2:L P P P J         (6.7) 
 
The symbol ɶ  will denote variations with respect to 1, ,y Y t . We have 
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(6.8) 
 
 
   
 
 
The Hamiltonian is, therefore, 
 
1
1
1 1 1
( , , , , , , , , ( ), , ) :
( , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , , )
( ) ( , , , , )
t
t
H H t t y u v Y U V
F t Y U V G t y u v t Y U V f t t y u v
s f s t y u v ds
 


  
     

i
    (6.9) 
 
At this stage, we are in a position to state two (out of the) necessary conditions for optimal 
equilibrium:  
 
the Hamiltonian equations for the co-states 
 
[ ( ) ] [ ]y Yt H H       
 
and the variational capture condition at termination of the game. 
 
    
 
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1 0 1 1 1 1
0 1
1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1
( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( , , ( ), ( ), ( ))
( )
( , , , , ) ( , , ( ), ( ), ( )) ( )
( , , ( ), ( ), ( ))
( )( ( ))
t
t
t
y
t
t
t
t
t
t
L t y t y t f t t y t u t v t dt t
dy t
t Y f t t Y U V t f t t y t u t v t y t dt
dt
f t t y t u t v t t dt
t y t dt
  
   

 
 
    
 

     


 

  




ɶ
 
 
1 1
0
1
0
1 1
1 1 1
1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1
( ) ( , , ( ), ( ), ( )) ( )
( , ( ),...)
( , ( ),...)
( , ( ),...)
( , ( ),...) ( , , , ) ( , ( ), ( ), ( )) ( )
t t
y
t t
Y
t
Y y
t
s f s t y t u t v t y t ds dt
t y t
t t y t Y
t
F t y t
t F t y t Y G t Y U V t G t y t u t y t y t dt
t
 
  
   
 
 
      

     

 

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1
0
1
1
0
0 1 1 1
0 1
1 1 1 1
1
( ) ( ) ( , , ( ), ( ), ( )) 0 ;
( )
( , , , , ) ( , , ( ), ( ), ( )) ( )
t
t
t
t
t
y t y t f t t y t u t v t dt
dy t
f t t Y U V f t t y t u t v t dt y t W
dt
  
   

 ɺ
    (6.10)  
 
Then the variational capture condition (involving the terms, out of Lɶ , that contain a factor of 
1t ) becomes 
     
1 1 1
1
1 1
( , ( ),...) ( ,...)
( ,...) 0
t y t F t
W G t
t t

 
    
 
      (6.11) 
 
The two Hamiltonian equations can be rewritten in extensive form as                                                             
 
1
1
1 1
( ) ( , ( ), ( ), ( )) ( , , ( ), ( ), ( ))
( ) ( , ,...) ;
( , , , ) ( , , , )
y y
t
y
t
Y Y
t G t y t u t v t f t t y t u t v t
s f s t ds
t Y U V F t Y U V



   
 
    
      (6.12) 
 
It is plain that   and   can be eliminated (under a certain transversality condition) from the 
full set of Hamiltonian equations and variational capture condition. Substitution of the second of 
(6.12) into (6.11) gives 
 
11 1 1
[( ( ,...)) ] ( ( ,...)) ( ,...) 0Y t Yt W F t W G t        .      (6.13) 
 
The expression in square brackets, in (6.13) above, is the Eulerian derivative 1
1
( ,...)D t
Dt

.  
 
Assuming that this derivative does not vanish (and this is a type of transversality condition at the 
moment of capture), we have  
 
 
1
1
1 1
1
( ,...)
( ( ,...)) ( ,...)Y
D t
F t W G t
Dt


 
    
 
      (6.14) 
 
then substitution of that expression for   into the second of (6.12) gives the value of  : 
 
 
 
 (6.15) 
 
 
 
  
1
1
1 1 1 1
1
( ,...)
( ( ,...)) ( ,...) ( , , , ) ( , , , )Y Y Y
D t
F t W G t t Y U V F t Y U V
Dt

 
        
 
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Example 6.1. A particular case is a linear Volterra game with quadratic performance functional 
and quadratic capture criterion. Because of the particularities of such a game, we shall rely only 
partly on the above treatment of a general Volterra game with pursuit-evasion ingredients, and 
we shall develop certain aspects of the solution of such a game directly. 
 
We take the state equation 
 
0
0( ) ( ) [ ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )]
t
t
y t y t A t s y s B t s u s C t s v s ds         (6.16) 
 
The capture criterion is taken as 
 
1
1 1 12
( ( )) ( ) ( ) 0Ty t y t M y t         (6.17) 
 
which is, of course, equivalent to 
 
 
1
2
1( ) ker ( )y t M       (6.18) 
 
    
 
Here, M is a symmetric nonnegative-definite matrix (of dimensions compatible with the 
dimension of y), 
1
2M  is the symmetric nonnegative-definite square root of M, and 
1
2ker( )M  is 
the nullspace of 
1
2M . 
The performance functional J is  
 
1
0
1 1
1 0 1 12 2
: ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
t
T T T T
t
J y t M y t y t M y t u t Qu t v t Rv t dt       (6.19) 
 
We have (as can be easily verified) 
 
  1 10 1 02 ( ( )T T T T T TY MW Y M W Y M Y U QU V RV Y M M

                (6.20) 
 
The Hamiltonian equation for the costate   is 
 
1
1 1( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )
t
T
t
t y t M A t t s A s t ds           (6.21) 
 
If ( , )s t  is a (matricial) resolvent kernel for the backward-time Volterra integral equation (6.21) 
(with direct kernel ( , )A s t ), then the costate can be represented as  
 
1
1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )
t
T T
t
t y t M A t t y s M A t s s t ds            (6.22) 
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Then, by the methods explained in previous sections, the saddle-point solution **
**( , )u v  is found 
as 
 
1
1
1
** 1
** 1
1
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )) ;
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ))
t
T
t
t
T
t
u t s B s t ds B t t Q
v t s C s t ds C t t R




     
     


      (6.23) 
 
The costate  , as expressed via (6.22), is still a functional of the state trajectory y. (This is in  
addition to the costate’s   dependence on  .) To remove the dependence on y, we use the 
representation (proved in section 3) 
 
0
**
1 1 ** 1( ) ( ) [ ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )]
t
t
y t y t B t s u s C t s v s ds         (6.24) 
 
Substitution of (6.23) into (6.24) results in expressing the state y in terms of   and  . The 
resulting expression for y , when substituted into (6.21), gives an integral equation for  which 
contains also  . We state the result of these calculations: 
 
0
1 1
0 0
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
min( , )
1 1
1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( , ) [ ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )]
( ) ( , ) ( )[ ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )]
t
T T T
t
t t s t
T T
t t t
t y t M A t t B t s Q B t s C t s R C t s M ds
s A s t ds s B s Q B t C s R C t M d ds

      
 
 
 
     
 
  

  
 
      (6.25) 
 
Thus the problem has been reduced to determining the final time 1t and finding Y, U, V, W, as 
solutions to a fixed-point problem, since the obtained values of **
**( , )u v , and the associated 
trajectory ( )y t , are required to satisfy 
 
**
** 1 1 1 1( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( )u t U v t V y t Y y t W   ɺ       (6.26) 
 
This translates to the system 
 
1
0
1
1 1
0
1
1 1
1
1 1
**
1 1 1 1 ** 1 1
**
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1, 1 ** 1, 1
( , ) ;
( , ) ;
( ) [ ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )] ;
( ) ( , ) ( , ) [ ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )]
t
t
t
t t
t
U B t t Q
V C t t R
Y y t B t s u s C t s v s ds
W y t B t t U C t t V B t s u s C t s v s ds


 
 
  
    

ɺ
  (6.27) 
 
Also, the capture condition (6.18) needs to be satisfied. 
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The system consisting of (6.18), (6.20), (6.21), (6.23) – (6.25), and (6.27) is the full set of first-
order necessary conditions for the pursuit – evasion Volterra game, as formulated in the present 
example 6.1.  It is a simple observation, but perhaps worth stating explicitly, that the 
determination of the capture time 1t  is the hardest part of this problem, and the only nonlinear 
ingredient; the rest of the necessary conditions are linear in the state, costate, and control 
variables. /// 
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